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In the September 1956 issue of this Journal, Morris Weitz published a very important and controversial article about aesthetics. It was such a basic article that philosophers must either agree with it or criticize it. Since I am convinced that there are fundamental difficulties in Weitz's position, I feel obliged to answer it in print as I did verbally at the American Philosophical Association meeting where it was first read.
Professor Weitz proposes that we drop the theorist's question, "What is the nature of art?" and ask instead the more fruitful question, "What sort of concept is 'art'?" Following this comes the very important sentence, "Rather than a definition, let us try for a logical description of the actual employment of the concept."
In order to clarify the problem here illustrated, I should like to shift from aesthetics to the philosophy of science. Suppose we imagine a philosopher saying, "It is more fruitful to ask 'What sort of concept is probability?' than to ask 'What is the nature of probability?"' I do not think that we would be tempted to say to such a man, "Probability is not a word and not a concept, though we may refer to probability by means of the word 'probability' and conceive it."
It seems clear to me that Weitz is not concerned with the word "art" as a grammarian might be concerned with it, nor is he concerned with the concept "art" as a logician might be concerned with it. Rather Weitz is concerned with the word "art" as Carnap, for example, might be concerned with the word "probability." Weitz says he wants to try for a "logical description of the actual employment of the concept 'art.' " He does not want to call this a definition, because as he uses the word "definition" it means Aristotelian real definitions.
II
For some reason or other, Weitz insists that in aesthetics "definition, reconstruction, and patterns of analysis are out of place since they distort, and add nothing to our understanding of art." Let us look for a moment at this term "definition." Is it not the case that Weitz is making a kind of definition of art in his answer to the question, "What is the logic of 'x' as a work of art?" And just as it seems to me that definition is in place, not only in aesthetics in general, but even in this particular paper by Weitz, so it seems to me that analysis is similarly in place. When Weitz says that "art" is both descriptive (like "chair"), and evaluative (like "good"), it seems to me that he is clearly making an analysis. Of course, real definition, at least as it has been conceived and accepted by the whole Aristotelian tradition has experienced much abuse, and deservedly, since it has been so completely tied up with the metaphysical view that what is being defined is certain fixed essences. But there is another sense of real definition, the common sense one, which is that kind of definition in which the properties of a given complex are enumerated; by properties is meant the elements or terms of a complex, together with their characteristics and the relations that obtain among them, and by complex, a fact or group of facts.
But perhaps Weitz is really telling us that this definition and analysis is not theory in aesthetics but

Having written this in 1949, Weitz has strangely given up the common-sense notion of real definitions in order to return to the real-definition of the Aristotelian tradition.
It is my own persuasion that the role of theory in aesthetics is to provide this sort of real definitions and that such definitions are far more than "summaries of argued-for recommendations to attend in certain ways to certain features of art." If we are to have any aesthetics at all, we must have some sort of definitions. Unless we have an understanding of the signification of the term "art," how can we write histories, or sociologies, or criticisms of art? To clarify the meaning of the term "art" is a cognitive enterprise, and aesthetics insofar as it is a branch of philosophy can justify its existence only to the extent that it provides a unifying definition in terms of which art can be organized. The definitions in aesthetics serve for writers about art the sort of use served by theories in science. A theory in science is the name for an organizing principle, unifying device, or intellectual hatrack upon which one can hang generalizations or laws. Observations, hypotheses, and laws are made in terms of a physicalistic language or are reducible to such a language. No such reduction is required in the case of theories. Theories have value for science because they are useful in achieving structure and organization. One does not speak of them as true or as false. One judges them rather as useful or not insofar as they are capable or incapable of providing unity to laws and observations contained in science. Likewise in aesthetics, definitions are valuable only if they provide a framework within which cognitive progress can be made in the study of art.
